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The role of social cognition, including theory of mind (ToM), in affecting quality of life (QoL)
along the course of diseases has been reported. This is a considerable aspect in chronic
pathologies, such as multiple sclerosis (MS), in which supporting and maintaining QoL
is of crucial importance. We aimed to investigate the relation between ToM, clinical
variables and neuropsychological profile in a cohort of adults with long lasting disease,
such as different clinical MS phenotypes (Relapsing Remitting -RR- versus Progressive
-Pr). In particular, our study focuses on (1) how (affective and cognitive) ToM impairment
occurs in different phenotypes, (2) whether MS ToM impairment is secondary to or
independent from cognitive deficit and (3) whether ToM deficit impacts QoL. 42 adults
with MS (18 M: 24 F, 52.38 ± 10.31 mean age, 21.24 ± 10.94 mean disease duration,
26 RR and 16 Pr) and 26 matched healthy controls (HC) (7 M: 19 F, 51.35 ± 12.42
mean age) were screened with a neuropsychological and ToM battery, assessing both
affective and cognitive components. We found statistically significant groups differences
in cognitive but not affective ToM, with a lower performance in PrMS than those with
a RRMS disease course. Also, significant predictive effects of neuropsychological tests
on ToM were identified in MS group. Finally, MS people with different level of affective
ToM differed significantly in QoL. ToM deficit in moderately disabled people with MS
involves cognitive but not affective ToM components with implications on QoL. It also
appears to be related to cognitive performance. As neurological and neurocognitive
profiles influence mentalizing in MS, ToM evaluation should be considered for inclusion
in clinical screening.
Keywords: multiple sclerosis, theory of mind, quality of life, social cognition, neurodegenerative diseases,
cognitive functions
INTRODUCTION
Social cognition is the life-long evolving neurocognitive capacity needed to process social
information. According to the most recent version of the American Psychiatric Association’s
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders, social cognition appears as one of the
six core components alongside neurocognitive functions such as memory, executive function,
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attention, orientation and language ability. There is general
consensus that preserved social cognition contributes to long-
term maintenance of people’s quality of life (QoL) (Dodell-Feder
et al., 2015; An and Jang, 2018). Recent studies have highlighted
the role of social cognition in affecting QoL along the course
of diseases (Maat et al., 2012), especially in chronic pathologies
(e.g., Bodden et al., 2010a; Phillips et al., 2011) such as multiple
sclerosis (MS).
Multiple sclerosis is an auto-immune mediated
neurodegenerative disease that strikes people already in
early adult age (Lassmann, 2018). The chronic and unpredictable
feature of this pathology leads patients to a sensitive management
of the disease together with high burden in various aspects of
daily life (Perrin, 2013). The course of the disease could be
subjected to variation over time or remain stable from the onset
of the pathology: patients can experience crisis which follow
fully disability recovery for all their life, it is the case of relapsing
remitting MS (RRMS), or they can initiate to do not completely
remit after relapses in a secondary phase of the illness, the case of
secondary progressive MS, or even they can present a constant
progression of the pathology from the onset of the disease, such
as in primary progressive MS. Progressive phenotypes show
increased pathological alterations in brain than remitting MS
(Lassmann et al., 2012). In these conditions, social cognition
abilities are crucial to hold relationships (Carotenuto et al., 2017)
and consequently to preserve social support network (Wineman,
1990), significant resource for a patient’s QoL.
Among social cognition components, theory of mind (ToM)
plays a crucial role, as the ability of individuals to think of
their own and others’ mental states to understand and predict
behavior (Wimmer and Perner, 1983; Tomasello, 1999; Baglio
and Marchetti, 2016). Recent works support the multi-domain
nature of this construct, dividing in affective and cognitive
parts, the hot and cold ToM (Poletti et al., 2012; Shamay-
Tsoory and Aharon-Peretz, 2007). In particular, the affective
component is responsible for the understanding of others’
emotions while cognitive ToM is recruited to understand others’
cognitive states, beliefs, thoughts and intentions. The importance
of studying ToM construct analyzing its different aspects is
corroborated by neuropsychological and imaging data (Shamay-
Tsoory et al., 2005; Kalbe et al., 2010). Specifically, evidence
supports a dissociation between cognitive and affective ToM
neural correlates in the medial prefrontal cortex: dorsal areas are
recruited in understanding cognitive mental states while ventral
regions are involved in affective state comprehension (Shamay-
Tsoory and Aharon-Peretz, 2007).
Considering that ToM is defined as being composed by
affective and cognitive components (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007),
it is not fully understood whether and how such components
are damaged in MS. While several contributions documented
the presence of a ToM deficit in MS (Henry et al., 2009; Banati
et al., 2010; Henry et al., 2011), only two works consider ToM
adopting latest multi-domain models, by focusing on both hot
and cold components in MS (see for example, Roca et al., 2014;
Raimo et al., 2017) reporting incongruent results. In one case it
seems that both cognitive and affective components are impaired
(Raimo et al., 2017) whereas in the other study only the cognitive
domain appeared affected (Roca et al., 2014). Also, additional
evidence documented a decline in the ability to discriminate
between emotional states in MS (Cotter et al., 2016).
Moreover, little is still known regarding as to whether ToM
impairment is related to disease duration and level of disability.
Most works included subjects with a low level of disability and
at an early stage of the disease, revealing the presence of a deficit
already since the early phases of the disease (Kraemer et al., 2013).
Furthermore, studies also reported greater impairment of ToM
abilities in progressive (Pr; such as Secondary Progressive MS
and Primary Progressive MS) compared to relapsing-remitting
(RR) MS (Berneiser et al., 2014; Radlak, 2014; Dulau et al., 2017).
However, recently, one work reported no difference in ToM
performance between MS phenotypes (Dulau, 2014). Hence, the
relation between ToM impairment and clinical course is not
yet well understood. Generally, there are few studies that have
characterized ToM impairment in MS populations and results are
conflicting. Literature meta-analysis and reviews agree that this
topic needs more investigation (Bora et al., 2016; Cotter et al.,
2016; Chalah and Ayache, 2017).
The role played by deficits in cognitive functions on ToM
impairment is another point of debate (Cabinio et al., 2015;
Chalah et al., 2017; Ciampi et al., 2018; Neuhaus et al., 2018; Wade
et al., 2018). This aspect is particularly interesting considering
that social cognition involves specific networks that overlap
and are connected with areas recruited for other cognitive
functions (Henry et al., 2016). Some studies highlighted that
ToM impairment is independent from cognitive domains mainly
affected in MS, e.g., executive functions (Neuhaus et al., 2018). On
the other hand, Dulau et al. (2017) have reported a link between
impairment in cognitive functions and ToM abilities. Moreover,
differences recently highlighted in cognitive impairment profile
between RR and progressive MS (Johnen et al., 2017) have also
to be considered whether it is supported that ToM is related to
cognitive functions.
Finally, although extensive data exist for cognitive functions
in MS, the link between ToM and QoL has received relatively
little attention. It is widely acknowledged that a deficit in ToM
has a crucial influence on QoL, especially in chronic conditions.
In fact, ToM, such as a crucial component of social cognition,
promotes the continuity of social activities during the entire
life span of patients, preventing also depressive symptomatology
(Chiaravalloti and DeLuca, 2008). Accordingly, literature reports
several works investigating the role of ToM on QoL in different
chronic pathologies (Bodden et al., 2010b; Urbach et al., 2013).
For what concerns the impact of ToM on QoL specifically in MS
condition, only few studies on this topic reported QoL measures
and even less reporting meaningful results. This is unexpected,
since good interpersonal relationships and social support have
been highlighted as important factors increasing QoL in MS
(Shwartz and Frohner, 2005). In addition, as concluded by
Raimo et al. (2017), ToM ability is extremely useful in everyday
life and social environment. Moreover, works on the topic
reported conflicting results: Phillips et al. (2011) identified social
cognition deficit as a main predictor of QoL in MS patients
(Cotter et al., 2016). Instead, Ciampi et al. (2018) reported no
correlation between ToM impairment and QoL. Given that QoL
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of persons who manage chronic pathologies is an urgent focus
of intervention, its relationship with SC is non-negligible and
a better understanding of such deficits is crucial to improving
patients’ QoL.
The main aim of this study was to assess the relation between
ToM, clinical variables (disease duration and disability level)
and neuropsychological profile in a cohort of adult patients
with different clinical phenotypes (Relapsing Remitting versus
Progressive). Hence, the specific aims consisted of determining:
[1] How (affective and cognitive) ToM impairment occurs in
relation with clinical phenotypes: Relapsing Remitting MS versus
Progressive MS versus healthy controls; [2] if ToM impairment
in MS is secondary to the cognitive deficits; [3] if deficit in ToM
competence impacts QoL.
On the light of the recent literature on the topic, we
hypothesized that Progressive MS phenotype shows a major
impairment in ToM abilities due to its neurodegenerative
pathogenic component, both in cognitive and affective parts
of ToM; in particular, according to the more severe cognitive
impairment found in Progressive than Relapsing Remitting MS,
we expected to find a relation between cognitive functions level
and ToM performance. Also, given the strong contribution
of mentalizing abilities in social relationships in daily life, we
hypothesized to observe a relation between QoL and ToM.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
A total of 68 subjects were enrolled in the study: 42 individuals
with MS and 26 healthy controls. Patients with MS were
consecutively recruited and screened at Don Carlo Gnocchi
Foundation, IRCCS, Milan (Italy). Inclusion criteria were: (1)
diagnosis of MS following McDonald revised diagnosis criteria
(Polman et al., 2011), (2) age < 75, (3) years of education ≥ 5,
(4) no change of pharmacological treatment in the 3 months
before the enrollment (5) no clinical relapses or use of steroid
treatment during 4 weeks before the enrollment (6) provided
informed consent for study participation. Exclusion criteria
were: (1) history of nervous system disorders different from
MS (2) unstable psychiatric illness, such as psychosis or major
depression (3) severe disability with Expanded Disability Status
Scale (EDSS, Kurtzke, 1983) score > 8 (4) moderate to severe
cognitive impairment (Mini Mental State Examination < 24) (5)
medication or comorbidities that may affect cognition (6) severe
visual or/and hearing impairment that did not allow to perform
evaluation battery.
A neurologist collected medical history and performed
physical examination of all MS patients. Based on Polman’s
Criteria (Polman et al., 2011) MS were defined Relapsing
Remitting MS (N = 26) or Progressive MS (N = 16). The
group of 16 Progressive MS comprised subjects with Secondary
Progressive MS (N = 8) and Primary Progressive MS (N = 8). For
all MS subjects EDSS and disease duration were collected.
26 healthy subjects from Don Carlo Gnocchi Foundation of
Milan were also recruited. They were personnel of the clinic
or healthy adults accessing to the clinic such as volunteers and
caregivers. The healthy participants were group-matched for
age, sex, and years of education with the MS group. Inclusion
criteria included not having any known neurological diseases or
psychiatric condition, a global cognitive function in normal value
for age and education, and do not taking any drugs that affect
cognitive functions.
The study was approved by Universitá Cattolica del
Sacro Cuore Ethical Committee. All participants received
the information sheet and signed the written informed consent.
ToM Instruments
The following ToM tasks evaluating both cognitive and
affective components of mentalization were administered to all
participants of the study:
[1] Reading the Mind from the Eyes (RMET, Baron-Cohen
et al., 2001): an affective ToM test (Duval et al., 2011;
Laisney et al., 2013). The task presents to the subject
36 visual stimuli, such as photographs of actors’ eyes
expressing a certain basic or complex emotion and requires
him/her to choose the right mental state among four
alternatives. Total score ranges from 0 to 36. We adopted
Gender test as the control task: we considered RMET data
only whether subject correctly performed the Gender test;
[2] Strange Stories (SS; Happé, 1994; Mazzola and Camaioni,
2002; Liverta Sempio et al., 2005): a selection of the Italian
version of Strange Stories, 4 mental and 4 physical (control
stories) content stories, were administered as an advanced
ToM task.
Subjects were presented orally stories in which a character
says something not literally true and they were asked
to explain reasons of the specific behavior of the
agent. Each story was presented once. Mentalistic stories
chosen in the current study require an understanding of
mental attribution in different social situations: conflicting
emotions, misunderstanding, white lie and double bluff.
Each story score ranges from 0 to 2: a score of 0 is attributed
when subject answers something incoherent with the story,
a score of 1 corresponds to a factual response, while 2
points score are given to a correct mentalistic answer.
The highest total score is 8 both for ToM and physical
content stories. Although this task is mainly presented in
literature as a cognitive ToM tool (Poletti et al., 2012),
a consensus on the cognitive or affective ToM nature of
this test has not yet reached; in fact, while some stories
lead to reason on characters’ thoughts, others are focuses
on characters’ emotions. For the purpose of this study, we
chose to consider not only Strange Story total score (0–8
range score), but also single-story scores (0–2 range score)
in order to compare thoughts understanding (cognitive
ToM), such as double bluff, misunderstanding and white lie
story, with emotion reasoning (affective ToM), in particular
conflicting emotions story.
[3] Faux pas (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999): a selection of the
Italian version of the test, specifically 4 faux pas and 4
matched control stories, were included in the evaluation
battery as an advanced ToM test. Subjects were asked
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to listen to stories, each story were presented orally and
once by the researcher, in which a faux pas happened
and to answer six questions. Questions require the faux
pas detection, the identification of the person who does
something awkward, the description and comprehension
of the content of the faux pas, the detection of false belief
and the answer to an empathy question. In case the subject
incorrectly answers the first question, the other questions
are not administered. The total score for each story ranges
from 0 to 6, with a maximum total score of 24. In addition
to the total score of the test, we focused on cognitive and
affective items in order to compare cognitive and affective
ToM performance: in particular, we reported score of the
intentionality question (cognitive ToM; score range 0–4)
and score of the emotional attribution question (affective
ToM; score range 0–4).
[4] Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC;
Dziobek et al., 2006; Fossati et al., 2018): the Italian version
of the test were administered as a naturalistic evaluation
of ToM abilities. The test consists in watching a 15-min
video clip representing an ecologic situation in which
four friends meet to have a dinner together. Video is
interrupted several times by a multiple-choice question
on emotions (17 item), thoughts (7 item) and intentions
(18 item) of the different characters. More specifically,
each question reports 4 alternative responses including
one correct mentalistic answer and three incorrect ones: a
non-mentalistic (missing), a over-mentalizing and a under-
mentalizing option. The task total score ranges from 0 to
42 and in addition yields a score corresponding to the
total number of mistakes due to over-mentalizing (0–42
range), under-mentalizing (0–42 range) and no mental
state attribution (0–42 range). Following the purpose
of the present study, we calculated scores separately
for emotions (affective ToM; 0–17 range), thoughts and
intentions items (cognitive ToM; respectively, 0–7 and 0–
18 range): in particular, we reported the sum of total
right responses, sum of mistakes due to over-mentalizing,
sum of mistakes due under-mentalizing, and sum of
mistakes due no mental state attribution for each of
them.
Neuropsychological Assessment
All participants underwent Montreal Cognitive Assessment
(MoCA) for global cognitive function evaluation (Santangelo
et al., 2015). The MS group was also assessed with the Brief
Repeatable Battery of Neuropsychological Test (BRB-NT; Rao,
1990) for an in-depth assessment of memory and executive
functions including the following neuropsychological tests: [1]
Selecting Reminding Test – Long Term Storage (SRT-LTS),
evaluating verbal immediate recall (cut-off :23.3); [2] Selective
Reminding Test – Consistent Long Term Retrieval (SRT-CLTR),
evaluating verbal memory storage (cut-off: 15.5); [3] 10/36 Spatial
Recall Test (SPART), a measure of visuo-spatial memory (cut-
off: 12.7); [4] Symbol Digit Modalities Test (SDMT), assessing
attention and speed of processing (cut-off: 37.9); [5] Paced
Auditory Serial Addition Test (PASAT 2/ PASAT 3), evaluating
divided attention (cut-off: 17.1/28.4); [6] Delayed Recall of the
Selective Reminding Test (SRT-D), assessing verbal delayed recall
(cut-off: 4.9); [7] Delayed Recall of the 10/36 Spatial Recall Test
(SPART-D), measuring visuo-spatial delayed recall (cut-off: 3.6);
[8] Word List Generation (WLG), a measure of the access to
lexicon through semantic category (cut-off: 17.0).
Psycho-Behavioral and QoL Assessment
The entire sample filled in the following behavioral
questionnaires administered in computerized form:
[1] Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996;
Ghisi et al., 2006): a measure of clinical depression (cut-
off < 16). The scale allows to extract two subscales:
cognitive symptoms and non-cognitive symptoms.
[2] State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – Y1 (STAI-Y1; Santangelo
et al., 2016): a test evaluating the presence of clinical level of
anxiety state (cut off 39–40). Total score ranges from 20 to
80.
[3] PARADISE 24 (Cieza et al., 2015): a questionnaire
measuring the impact of brain disorders on people’s lives.
Total score ranges from 0 (no impact) to 100 (extreme
impact) (Giovannetti et al., 2016). The questionnaire was
filled in only by participants with MS.
[4] Multiple Sclerosis Quality of Life 54 questionnaire
(MSQOL54; Solari et al., 1999): a measure of QoL in MS
sample including all items of the Short form 36 health
survey questionnaire (SF36; Jenkinson et al., 1993) and of
the MS18 module. Only items of SF12 were administered to
healthy control subjects. SF36 allows to extract two Health
total scores: Physical and Mental Health. Specifically,
following SF36 model, Physical Health scale was calculated
on Physical Functioning, Role-Physical, Bodily Pain and
General Health sub-scales, while Mental Health was
calculated on Vitality, Social Functioning, Role-Emotional
and Mental Health sub-scales.
Procedure
Neuropsychological functioning, behavioral profile and ToM
ability were evaluated in a dedicated session by a psychologist.
The evaluation session was individual and took place in a quiet
room. It was divided in two parts, lasting about 1 h each. The
order of the two evaluation sections was balanced.
The session included a classic paper and pencil
neuropsychological evaluation, the administration of ToM
tests and behavioral questionnaires. Part of the assessment was
carried out via computer.
Healthy participants took part in the same session with a
reduced neuropsychological evaluation.
Statistical Analysis
Data was analyzed with Statistical Package for Social Sciences
(SPSS, IBM Corporation), version 24.
To test how (affective and cognitive) ToM impairment
occurs in relation to clinical phenotypes, a statistical comparison
between MS and healthy controls was performed. Normal
distribution of variables was checked through normality test
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on variables residuals. According to this test, parametric
(independent t-test) or non-parametric analysis (Mann–Whitney
U) was performed for the comparison between the two groups
(MS and healthy controls). Also, Multiple General Linear Model
was run to compare cognitive and affective ToM among the three
groups. SS Physical stories, Faux Pas control stories and BDI-II
were included in the Model as covariates.
To test whether ToM impairment in MS comes from
the cognitive deficit we firstly run correlation analysis
including all MS sample between ToM performance and
neuropsychological scores. Then, Linear Regression was
calculated to investigate predictive relations between ToM
performance and neuropsychological measures in all MS group.
To test whether a low performance of ToM is related to a lower
QoL, General Linear Model was performed with QoL scores as
within-subject factor and ToM scores as between-subject factor.
Results were considered statistically significant at p < 0.05.
RESULTS
Participants
Table 1 presents demographic characteristics of MS and group
comparison results. Control group matched MS groups for age,
gender and education. In line with literature, MS group showed
to be more depressed than healthy controls, specifically due to
no cognitive symptoms. Also, we found a statistically significant
difference between healthy controls and MS groups in Physical
Health Composite Score (PHCS). This result was significant both
observing the whole MS group and focusing on different MS
phenotypes. In particular, comparing the three groups, Kruskal–
Wallis test reported that both RR and Pr MS groups had a lower
PHCS than healthy controls. Table 2 reports neuropsychological
test results. In particular, a statistically significant difference
between MS and healthy control groups in MoCA total score
was also observed, with a worse performance in MS subjects
than healthy control group, albeit it remained over Santangelo’s
correction cut-off ( < 15.05). Specifically, One-way ANOVA
with MoCA score as dependent variable and phenotype as
independent variable showed a main effect of phenotype and
Bonferroni post hoc test reported a statistically significant
difference only between PrMS and healthy control group. BRB-
NT assessment reported a mean total score over cut-off for each
sub-scale in MS sample.
AIM 1: How Does Affective and Cognitive
ToM Impairment Occur in Relation With
Clinical Phenotype?
Table 3 reports ToM tasks groups performance and comparison
results. In general, we found statistically significant groups
differences in SS and Faux pas total score. Specifically, we
observed that both MS groups showed a significant lower SS
global score than healthy controls; while only Pr MS group
differed significantly from healthy controls in Faux-pas total
score. Considering cognitive and affective items of SS and
Faux-pas, results highlighted a significant groups differences
in cognitive items only: MS groups showed lower scores than
TABLE 1 | Demographic characteristics and group comparison results.
HCD N = 26 all MS N = 42 MS/HC
comparison
p RRMS N = 26 PrMS N = 16 RRMS/PrMS/HC
comparison
p
Gender [M:F] 7:19 18:24 3.76& − 10:16 8:8 2.94& −
Age [M, sd] 51.35,12.42 52.38,10.31 −0.37§ − 50.42,10.09 55.56,10.18 1.96£ −
Years of education [M,
sd]
14.88,4.93 12.76,4.21 1.89§ − 12.42,2.86 13.31,5.86 3.42£ −
EDSS[Median, range] − 6,1–8 − − 6, 1–7 7, 6–8 − −
Disease duration [M,
sd]
− 21.24,10.94 − − 21.08,11.86 21.50,9.60 − −
BDI-II [M, sd] 5.00, 4.89 8.86,8.69 −2.13∧ 0.04 9.38, 8.98 8.00, 7.44 4.06£ −
Cognitive symptoms 1,42, 2,32 2,55,3,42 −1.48∧ − 2.85, 3.73 2.06, 2.91 2.85£ −
No cognitive
symptoms
3.58, 3.61 6.31,5.30 −2.31∧ 0.03 6.54, 5.59 5.94, 4.93 4.98£ −
STAI-Y1[M, sd] 13.19, 3.20 15.67,6.03 −1.93∧ − 15.77,5.69 15.50,6.74 3.14£ −
PARADISE [M, sd] − 50.03,16.08 − − 50.66,16.15 49.00,16.44 − −
MSQOL54 [M, ds]
Physical health 55.95, 17.32 − − 58.70, 18.54 51.47, 14.58 − −
Mental health 64.20, 20.76 − − 65.06, 21.94 62.81, 19.28 − −
SF12 [M, sd]
Physical health 51.41, 6,53 34.87, 9.61 103.00∧ 0.000 36.34, 10.58 32.47, 7.47 32.39◦ 0.000
Mental health 49.46, 10.04 51.10, 10.71 482.50∧ − 51.10, 10.70 51.11, 11.05 0.64◦ −
BDI-II, beck depression inventory, HC, healthy controls; M, mean; MS, multiple sclerosis; MSQOL54, multiple sclerosis quality of life 54; RRMS, relapsing remitting multiple
sclerosis; PrMS, progressive multiple sclerosis; sd, standard deviation; STAI -Y1, State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – Y1. § T-test for independent samples was performed;
&Chi-squared test was performed; ◦Kruskal–Wallis test was performed;∧Mann–Whitney test was performed; £One-way ANOVA was performed. Statistically significant
results are reported in bold.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 February 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 218
fpsyg-10-00218 February 5, 2019 Time: 19:15 # 6
Isernia et al. Theory of Mind in MS
TABLE 2 | Neuropsychological test and group comparison results.
Score
Range
HC N = 26 all MS
N = 42
MS/HC
comparison
p RRMS N = 26 PrMS N = 16 RRMS/PrMS/HC
comparison
p
MoCA [M, sd] 0–30 26.61, 2.10 22.92, 3.30 2.40§ 0.007 24.96, 3.56 22.87, 3.28 5.32£ 0.008
BRB-NT [M, sd]
SRT-LTS [M, sd] 0–72 − 35.85, 14.80 − − 37.31, 14.02 33.47, 16.16 −
SRT-CLTR [M, ds] 0–72 − 29.37, 15.56 − − 30.56, 16.52 27.44, 14.16 −
SPART [M, sd] 0–30 − 19.47, 5.74 − − 19.42, 5.35 19.56, 6.51 −
SDMT [M, sd] 0–110 − 39.72, 16.05 − − 41.55, 17.63 36.75, 13.08 −
PASAT2 [M, sd] 0–60 − 25.76, 11.75 − − 35.11, 15.22 31.18, 11.45 −
PASAT3 [M, sd] 0–60 − 33.62, 13.89 − − 28.13, 13.43 21.93, 7.16 −
SRT-D [M, sd] 0–12 − 6.84, 2.48 − − 7.08, 2.56 6.46, 2.37 −
SPART-D [M, sd] 0–10 − 6.88, 2.12 − − 7.11, 2.54 6.52, 1.55 −
WLG [M, sd] 0-∞ − 21.29, 5.97 − − 21.09, 7.08 21.63, 3.72
BRB-NT, brief repeatable battery of neuropsychological test; MoCA, montreal cognitive assessment; PASAT 2, 2 s paced auditory serial addition test; PASAT 3, 3 s
paced auditory serial addition test; SDMT, symbol digit modalities test; SPART, 10/36 spatial recall test; SPART-D, delayed recall of the 10/36 spatial recall test;
SRT-D, delayed recall of the selective reminding test; SRT-CLTR, selective reminding test – consistent long term retrieval; SRT-LTS, selecting reminding test – long
term storage; WLG, word list generation. §T-test for independent samples was performed; £One-way ANOVA was performed. Statistically significant results are reported
in bold.
healthy controls in double bluff, white lie and misunderstanding,
but not contrasting emotions stories, as well as they reported
lower score in intentionality item, but not in emotion item of
Faux pas. In line with total score results, both RR and Pr MS
groups differed from healthy controls in SS cognitive stories,
while only Pr MS group had a lower score than healthy controls
in intentionality question of Faux pas. Moreover, we found a
statistically significant difference between the three groups in
over-mentalizing errors for affective items of MASC. Mann–
Whitney and Bonferroni post hoc test showed that the difference
was explained only by RR and Pr MS groups, with a higher score
of Pr MS group.
A multivariate General Linear Model (GLM) was performed
with 4 levels of SS (contrasting emotions, double bluff,
misunderstanding and white lie) as within-subject factor and 3
levels of phenotype (healthy controls, RR MS and Pr MS) as
between-subject factor. Results showed a main effect of phenotype
for double bluff (F2,65 = 3.32, p = 0.042, partial-η2 = 0.09,
observed power = 0.61) and white lie (F2,65 = 4.84, p = 0.011,
partial-η2 = 0.13, observed power = 0.78), and a trend of
phenotype for misunderstanding (F2,65 = 3.09, p = 0.05, partial-
η2 = 0.09, observed power = 0.58). The analysis was run also with
SS physical stories and BDI-II as covariates: results continued
to show a main effect of phenotype for white lie (F2,65 = 5.58,
p = 0.006, partial-η2 = 0.15, observed power = 0.84), a trend
for double bluff (F2,65 = 3.07, p = 0.053, partial-η2 = 0.09,
observed power = 0.57), but not anymore for misunderstanding
(F2,65 = 2.18, p = 0.122, partial-η2 = 0.06, observed power = 0.43).
Also, a multivariate GLM was performed with 2 level of Faux
pas (intentionality and emotion) as within-subject factor and 3
level of phenotype (healthy controls, RR MS and Pr MS) as
between-subject factor. We observed a main effect of phenotype
only for intentionality (F2,65 = 3.46, p = 0.037, partial-η2 = 0.10,
observed power = 0.63). We repeated analysis with BDI-II as
covariates and we didn’t find any statistically significant effect of
this variable.
AIM 2: Is ToM Impairment Secondary to
Cognitive Deficit in MS?
We found a statistically significant correlation between SS and
MoCA (r = 0.394, p = 0.010), SPART (r = 0.496, p = 0.001),
SDMT (r = 0.310, p = 0.046), PASAT3 (r = 0.355, p = 0.021),
PASAT2 (r = 0.306, p = 0.049), SPART-D (r = 0.384, p = 0.012)
and WLG (r = 0.343, p = 0.026). Results also showed that Faux
pas performance statistically significant correlated with SPART
(r = 0.397, p = 0.009), SDMT (r = 0.312, p = 0.044), PASAT3
(r = 0.437, p = 0.004), SRT (r = 0.438, p = 0.004) and SPART-D
(r = 0.336, p = 0.030). Finally, we found a statistically significant
correlation between RMET and SPART (r = 0.394, p = 0.010).
To verify whether executive functions have a predictive
effect on ToM performance in all MS sample, regression
analyses were performed introducing SDMT and PASAT3 on
(1) SS performance and (2) Faux pas (dependent variable),
alongside phenotype (RR, Pr). These predictors were entered,
hierarchically, in two steps: model 1: SDMT, PASAT3; model 2:
SDMT, PASAT3, phenotype.
Results showed that model 1 tended to be statistically
significant in predicting SS (Model 1: F2,41 = 3.24, p = 0.05,
R2 = 0.14, R2adjusted = 0.10), while both models were statistically
significant in predicting Faux pas (Model 1: F2,41 = 4.61,
p = 0.016, R2 = 0.19, R2adjusted = 0.15; Model 2 = F2,41 = 3.87,
p = 0.017, R2 = 0.23, R2adjusted = 0.17). Statistical details are listed
in Table 4.
Does Deficit in ToM Competence Impact
QoL in MS?
To test whether different level of ToM differed significantly in
level of QoL, we performed GLM models with MSQOL54 scores
as within-subject factor and ToM performance as between-subject
factor.
We observed a main effect of SS contrasting emotion story on
both Physical Health (F2,42 = 3.65, p = 0.019, partial-η2 = 0.16,
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TABLE 4 | Regression analysis models of executive functions on ToM performance in all MS sample.
Model 1 Model 2
Predictors B SE(B) β B SE(B) β
(1) SS SDMT 0.02 0.02 0.20 0.02 0.02 0.20
PASAT3 0.02 0.02 0.21 0.02 0.02 0.21
Phenotypedummy 0.05 0.43 0.02
R2 0.14 0.14
F for change in R2 3.24∧ 2.11
P 0.05 −
N 42 42 42 42 42 42
(2) FP SDMT −0.00 0.08 −0.00 −0.01 0.08 −0.02
PASAT3 0.19 0.09 0.44 0.19 0.09 0.42
Phenotypedummy −2.55 1.76 −0.21
R2 0.19 0.23
F for change in R2 4.61 3.87
P 0.016 0.017
N 42 42 42 42 42 42
FP, faux pas; SS, strange stories; ∧tendency to significance. Statistically significant results are reported in bold.
observed power = 0.64) and Mental Health (F2,42 = 4.25,
p = 0.007, partial-η2 = 0.18, observed power = 0.71).
DISCUSSION
Social cognition deficit in neurodegenerative chronic conditions
is increasingly being investigated with respect to its impact on
daily life (An and Jang, 2018). Recently, research highlighted the
presence of ToM impairment in MS population (Henry et al.,
2011). However, it is still not clear which components of ToM
are damaged as well as the role of clinical profile and cognitive
functions. The present study aimed to evaluate ToM in MS,
considering both affective and cognitive components, and its
relationship with clinical and neurocognitive profile. Also, the
impact of ToM deficit on QoL was investigated.
In our study MS subjects failed in ToM tasks described
in literature as advanced tests with a considerable level
of complexity (Banerjee, 2005; Devine and Hughes, 2016).
In particular, we found a stronger impairment in cognitive
mentalizing ability of Pr MS, who fell both in SS and Faux-
pas cognitive items, than RR MS, who reported only a minor
performance in SS cognitive items. The only exception interested
MASC cognitive items, in which our MS patients did not show
a damage. With respect of this latter result, the dynamic feature
of the stimuli distinguishes MASC from other ToM tasks, as it
allows patients to experience stimuli showing all body agent’s
figure in movement. This issue, combined with the presence of
the plot underlining characters’ exchanges, could have acted as
a scaffolding element, favoring compensatory arrangements. In
fact, some studies have shown that reading fiction supports ToM
development (Kidd and Castano, 2013; Pino and Mazza, 2016);
it is therefore plausible that even a cinematographic plot may
have some positive influence on the understanding of mental
states. With regards to dynamism, some studies investigated
the activation of different neural pathways depending on static,
generally less ecologic, or dynamic features of emotional stimuli
(Di Dio et al., 2016). In particular, the distribution of neural
activations in response to biological motion of facial expression
differs from static representation of emotional expressions (Kilts
et al., 2003; Trautmann et al., 2009). The fact that our sample
showed a cognitive ToM impairment in all tasks except for the
one with stimuli resembling to real life situation, considered
indeed more ecological, lead us to hypothesize that mentalizing
damage in MS could not have a strong functional real-life
implication and reveals itself only in situations which individual
is not familiar with.
Focusing on affective ToM, the fact that affective items
were not impaired leads one to assume that the difficulty
in MS is limited to the comprehension of thoughts and
intentions, but not emotions. Taken together, these results suggest
dissociative damage of cognitive and affective ToM in this
population. Indeed, in both SS and Faux pas task we found
that affective comprehension was maintained. Moreover, RMET
performance was comparable to the healthy population. This
latter result was unexpected and counter-trend, since facial
emotions identification has consistently been shown impaired in
MS patients (Henry et al., 2009; Banati et al., 2010). However,
to our knowledge, this is the first study investigating ToM in
individuals with a long story of MS, such as 20 years of disease
history, with no cognitive impairment. Moreover, also the mean
age of our groups was major than previous works and, given that
it is demonstrated in literature that age is negatively correlated
with RMET performance (Fischer et al., 2017), it is plausible
to assume that MS performance to affective ToM did not differ
from a group of age-matched healthy subjects. In general, the
dissociation of ToM components (cognitive versus affective)
in clinical conditions has been documented in the literature
(Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007; Poletti et al., 2012). However, to our
knowledge, only two studies addressed this issue in MS (Raimo
et al., 2017; Roca et al., 2014) with contrasting results. The work
of Raimo et al. (2017) reported no dissociation in ToM in early
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stages of the disease, while, on the contrary, Roca et al. (2014)
demonstrated the presence of only cognitive ToM deficit in early
MS. Our results, including a MS population with a moderate
disability (EDSS, median = 6, range = 1–8) and a quite long
disease story (disease duration, mean 21.24), confirmed Roca
et al. (2014) evidence: cognitive and not affective ToM is impaired
in MS. Our findings, in accordance with the results of Roca
et al. (2014), lead to the assumption that this dissociation lasts
from early until moderate stages of the disease. Also, we can
hypothesize that the cognitive component of ToM is impaired
from the beginning of the disease, as Roca et al. (2014) reported,
while affective ToM impairment occurs in a second phase. Only
a longitudinal study can disentangle this question.
Analyzing the relation between cognitive performance and
mentalizing, data showed significant predictive effects of
neuropsychological measures on ToM, especially on advanced
ToM tasks, requiring a higher cognitive load, in which MS
sample encountered more difficulties. Interestingly, we found
that executive function and phenotype only predicted faux pas
performance, while only executive function and not phenotype
predicted SS. This data, in accordance with some previous studies
(Chalah et al., 2017; Dulau et al., 2017) suggests that cognitive
level plays a role, a predictive effect, on ToM impairment in
patients with MS. The fact that specific brain regions underlying
social cognition are also involved or overlap with areas serving for
other non-social cognitive functions (Henry et al., 2016; Wade
et al., 2018) could partly explain the strong relation between
cognitive functions and ToM found in the present study. Also,
this result is in line with studies attesting diverse cognitive factors
associated with disease progression (Chiaravalloti and DeLuca,
2008) and not only to the cerebral dissociations of cognitive and
affective routes of ToM networks. In line with this evidence, we
reported a predictive role specific for executive functions only
on ToM task in which MS remitting and progressive phenotype
differed. Findings of Ciampi et al. (2018) support the direct
correlation of social cognition performance with traditional
cognitive domains in progressive MS. Accordingly, we reported
a major damage of ToM in progressive typologies of MS, in line
with evidence of works of Berneiser et al. (2014), Dulau et al.
(2017), and Radlak (2014).
In addition, the present study investigated not only the
relationship between cognitive functions and ToM, but also
between QoL and ToM. Results suggested a significant
implication of affective ToM on different domains of QoL, which
is in line with evidence of works demonstrating the crucial
role of social cognition in supporting QoL (Maat et al., 2012).
Specifically, we found that subjects with a lower score of strange
stories on emotions differed in level of physical and mental QoL.
This finding supports the central role of social mind abilities in
impacting QoL of people with MS. On the other hand, this result
revealed us that only affective and not cognitive ToM is related
with QoL. As in our sample affective ToM was preserved, we
can assume that the implications of mentalizing impairment in
everyday life do not consistently influence MS QoL.
Our study is not without limitations. First of all, due to the
limited number of cases of secondary and primary progressive
MS patients enrolled in the study, we were only able to
investigate RRMS and Progressive MS groups. In addition, the
fact that healthy subjects were not administrated all selected
neuropsychological battery, but only MoCA, could have moved
the attention from possible informative data for the discussion
of results. Another limitation of the present work consists in the
lack of an IQ test, not allowing to investigate relations between
mentalizing and intelligence in MS patients. Also, due to the
cross-sectional nature of our study, we are limited in our ability
to investigate causal effects between the investigated domains.
Future longitudinal studies and cross-sectional studies with wider
samples are needed.
In general, the present study confirmed our first hypothesis
reporting a major ToM impairment in progressive phenotype
than remitting MS. Unexpectedly, we found a dissociation
between cognitive and affective ToM, with a specific deficit of
cognitive ToM that still not affect more real-life resembling
stimuli. Results were also aligned with our second hypothesis:
cognitive functions predict advanced mentalizing abilities in MS.
Finally, a relation between QoL and ToM, specifically affective
component of ToM, was demonstrated.
CONCLUSION
Cognitive but not affective components of ToM are impaired
in MS with a long disease duration. Both clinical and
cognitive variables have a substantial role: PrMS appears more
damaged in cognitive ToM and cognitive functions predict ToM
performance. In this work we focused on the evaluation of
a specific domain of social cognition in MS, such as ToM.
However, future contributions may highlight on the whole
social cognition assessment (Labbé et al., 2018), including also
affective empathy, social behavior and social perception. Given
the impact of ToM on QoL in MS, clinical practice should include
psychosocial evaluation in MS screening with the future purpose
to offer patients multidimensional interventions including social
cognition rehabilitation activities for this population.
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